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It is axiomatic that tobacco smoking is hazardous to health. The statistics are well documented and often very grim. For example, the 2008 World 
Health Organization Report on the global tobacco 
epidemic presented the following statistics: a hundred 
million people died of tobacco-related diseases glob-
ally in the 20th century; there are approximately over 
five million tobacco-related deaths every year; and an 
estimated one billion could die of tobacco-related dis-
eases in this 21st century.1 
Significantly, no other risky, self-indulgent addic-
tive behaviors such as cocaine abuse directly endanger 
bystanders as much as cigarette smoking or tobacco 
use endangers nonsmokers through secondhand 
tobacco smoke2 or inhaled environmental tobacco 
smoke (ETS).3 Environmental tobacco smoke com-
prises sidestream smoke (smoke that emanates from 
the burning end of a tobacco product) and mainstream 
smoke (smoke exhaled by the smoker).4 About 85 per-
cent of environmental tobacco smoke is sidestream 
smoke, while the remainder is mainstream smoke.5 
Most significantly, environmental tobacco smoke 
harbors over 4,000 mostly unsavory chemicals, rang-
ing from arsenic, benzene, cadmium, chromium, beryl-
lium, carbon monoxide, ammonia, hydrogen, cyanide, 
to formaldehyde.6 Of these chemicals, 50 are known to 
cause cancer, while at least 250 are generally harmful 
to health.7 The great irony, however, is that sidestream 
smoke, to which nonsmokers are exposed, is reput-
edly “richer in known carcinogens than is the smoke 
that smokers themselves inhale.”8 Individuals exposed 
to environmental tobacco smoke would inevitably 
inhale nicotine, which would be absorbed directly into 
their bloodstream, where it would degrade relatively 
quickly, and through ensuing metabolism, morph into 
continine.9 Nicotine levels in the bloodstream tend to 
reflect evidence of more recent exposure to environ-
mental tobacco smoke, while continine is symptom-
atic of longer or more distant exposure.10 
Study has shown that passive smokers would typi-
cally have continine levels of about one percent of 
those found in active smokers.11 However, the greater 
the levels of exposure of nonsmokers to environmental 
tobacco smoke, the higher the concentration of conti-
nine in their body.12 For example, a nonsmoking wife 
who is exposed to protracted periods of environmen-
tal tobacco smoke from her smoking husband at home 
is said to run approximately 34 percent greater risk 
of lung cancer than a nonsmoking wife, whose hus-
band does not smoke at home.13 More troublingly, an 
average nonsmoking person at work who is constantly 
exposed to multiple cigarette smokers would receive 
close to four times the dose of environmental tobacco 
smoke than the nonsmoking spouse would receive at 
home.14 This would resonate well with workers who 
operate in work environments where cigarette smok-
ing is the norm. These would include restaurant work-
ers, bar attendants, and waitresses, for example, and is 
arguably one of the reasons that cities across the world 
now prohibit smoking at such venues.15
Thus, exposure to environmental tobacco smoke 
would inevitably lead to a slow but gradual build-up 
of nicotine and continine in the bloodstream of non-
smokers. Given that passive smoking is character-
ized as involuntary smoking,16 it is literally nothing 
short of assault on nonsmokers,17 and a fatal one at 
that, in light of the well-documented health hazards 
posed to nonsmokers by high levels of nicotine and 
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continine in their bloodstream. For example, a 1990 
Dutch Health Council Advisory Report found inter 
alia that inhaled environmental tobacco smoke or 
passive smoking could increase the risk of lung cancer 
by 20 percent; significantly increase the risk of other 
forms of cancer; or the risk of cardiovascular disease 
by 20 to 30 percent; increase the risk of underweight 
children by pregnant women by 20 to 40 percent; 
and double (by 100 percent) the risk of sudden infant 
death syndrome.18 Furthermore, in the United States, 
secondhand tobacco smoke is held accountable for 
an estimated 3,400 annual lung cancer deaths, and 
approximately between 22,700 to 69,600 annual 
heart disease deaths amongst adult nonsmokers.19 
Significantly, tobacco smoking also foists concomi-
tant economic burdens on individuals, corporate bod-
ies, and the society as a whole.20 For instance, the very 
act of accommodating smokers’ needs in customized 
smoking shelters in public spaces comes embedded 
with costs. This is exemplified by the report that since 
1996, the U.S. Defense Department alone has spent 
at least $17.9 million dollars on the construction of 
self-standing smoking shelters.21 While well-funded 
government agencies are arguably better suited to 
absorb the costs inherent in accommodating smokers 
in customized shelters, it is an externality that some 
businesses can ill afford. Ever anxious about the bot-
tom line, some U.S. employers now controversially 
give preference to nonsmoking employees, or tie ciga-
rette smoking cessation to job security and continuing 
employment in order to, inter alia, cut the premium 
costs of employees’ health care insurance coverage.22 
While this measure would appear extreme and 
could be tantamount to discriminating against smok-
ing employees or trampling on their autonomy and 
privacy rights,23 there is no denying the soundness of 
its costs-cutting objective and its potential to wean 
cigarette smokers off smoking, and thereby reverse 
the escalating costs of smoking, which, in the United 
States, was estimated at $97 billion by the FDA.24 
This figure comprises $50 billion in direct health care 
costs, $7 billion in direct morbidity costs, and $40 bil-
lion in lost future earnings from premature deaths.25 
Obviously, these smoking-induced expenses could be 
put to a better public use. In the United Kingdom, for 
example, evidence suggests that a general reduction in 
smoking would lead to an increase in overall employ-
ment and that the economic benefits of reducing pas-
sive smoking do outweigh its costs.26 
While economics is a strong driving force in the 
general tobacco smoking reduction policy, arguably, 
the main justification for banning tobacco smoking in 
enclosed public spaces is the imperatives of protecting 
non-smokers from inhaled environmental or second-
hand tobacco smoke. This justification is the hallmark 
of “public health” defense cum safety strategies, which 
was alluded to by the Scottish Health Minister, who 
following the 2006 tobacco smoking ban in enclosed 
public spaces, was quoted as saying that: 
 As a smoke-free nation, Scotland can look forward 
to a healthier future…. A future where Scots live 
longer, families stay together longer and our young 
people are fitter and better prepared to make the 
most of their ambitions.27
Thus, without doubt, public health protection is the 
critical mass of the general governmental tobacco 
smoking discouragement policy,28 or the bourgeon-
ing global wave of tobacco smoking proscription in 
enclosed public spaces,29 which is arguably buoyed 
by the 2005 World Health Organizations’ Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control.30 The WHO Treaty 
stresses the imperatives of protecting all persons from 
exposure to tobacco smoke:31
 Parties recognize that scientific evidence has 
unequivocally established that exposure to tobacco 
smoke causes death, disease and disability…. Each 
Party shall adopt and implement in areas of exist-
ing national jurisdiction as determined by national 
law and actively promote at other jurisdictional 
levels the adoption and implementation of effective 
legislative, executive, administrative and/or other 
measures, providing for protection from exposure 
to tobacco smoke in indoor workplaces, public 
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Given that passive smoking is characterized as involuntary smoking, 
it is literally nothing short of assault on nonsmokers, and a fatal one at that,  
in light of the well-documented health hazards posed to nonsmokers  
by high levels of nicotine and continine in their bloodstream. 
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transport, indoor public places and, as appropriate, 
other public places.32 
However, there is no doubt that tobacco use or ciga-
rette smoking is an autonomous and indeed, very pri-
vate act.33 Therefore, the central question in this paper 
is: Should political intervention in a private affair as 
basic as tobacco smoking in enclosed public spaces 
be justified in the name of public health protection? 
This main question arguably raises entwined legal 
and ethical sub-questions: Is there a right to tobacco 
use or to freely smoke as such? If there were such a 
right, wouldn’t political intervention in the free use of 
tobacco products smack of paternalism or undermine 
smokers’ privacy or their right to freely smoke? And if 
public health interests were so paramount, wouldn’t a 
blanket ban, rather than the current partial tobacco-
smoking proscription in enclosed public spaces, be 
more expedient in safeguarding the public health? 
The interconnectedness of these sub-questions to the 
main question will be expatiated on in relative detail 
in subsequent parts of this paper. To start, I will briefly 
explore the concept of public health, and then use eth-
ical principles of paternalism, harm, utilitarian mor-
alism, and rights-based legal arguments to analyze 
the public health defense rationalizations of tobacco 
smoking prohibition in enclosed public spaces. 
Deconstructing the Concept of  
“Public Health”
Understanding the jurisprudential, ethical, and con-
ceptual parameters of “public health” is vital to grasp-
ing public health justificatory grounds for tobacco 
smoking discouragement policy in general, and 
tobacco smoking proscription in enclosed public 
spaces in particular. Such an understanding could also 
help inform the central inquiry of this paper on the 
propriety of political intervention or control of a pri-
vate behavior as basic as tobacco smoking in enclosed 
public spaces. 
Conceptual and definitional analyses of “public 
health” are susceptible to varied connotations, rang-
ing from the normative, descriptive to the specific, 
and making the term a “contested concept.”34 Indeed, 
the term “public health” tends to be characterized by 
a myriad of “public health problems,” ranging from 
infectious diseases, cigarette smoking, pollution, 
inadequate sanitation, societal inequalities, domestic 
violence, teenage pregnancy, gambling, to suicide.35 
Thus, the term “public health” seems to cover every 
conceivable social and economic problematic that 
put the society or public at risk.36 However, it is this 
propensity for hotchpotch or arbitrarily generic con-
ceptualization of “public health” that invariably raises 
the inevitable task of determining which amongst its 
numerous constituents is a “legitimate candidate for 
public health activity.”37 While that task is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it would suffice for our purposes to 
adopt the comprehensive albeit descriptive definition 
proffered by James F. Childress et al.: 
 Public health is primarily concerned with the 
health of the entire population, rather than the 
health of individuals. Its features include an 
emphasis on the promotion of health and the pre-
vention of disease and disability; the collection and 
use of epidemiological data, population surveil-
lance, and other forms of empirical quantitative 
assessment; a recognition of the multidimensional 
nature of the determinants of health; and a focus 
on the complex interactions of many factors — bio-
logical, behavioral, social and environmental — in 
developing effective interventions.38 
Consequently, if public health issues were mainly 
about concerns for, and the protection of the health of 
the general public rather than that of individuals, then 
the best entity most suited to safeguard public health 
is the government, due to its inherent legal and moral 
authority to do so.39 Indeed, government’s legitimacy 
to regulate public health issues is directly anchored on 
its authority to govern and protect public interest.40 
With respect to tobacco discouragement policy in 
general, and cigarette smoking proscription in enclosed 
public spaces in particular, examples of such deliber-
ate governmental policies ostensibly on behalf of the 
collectives, abound. These range from the unusually 
high tariffs on tobacco sales, compulsory labeling bear-
ing graphic or explicit health warnings on cigarette 
packaging, to banning of tobacco sales to under-age 
persons.41 In the United States, for example, follow-
ing the 1964 Surgeon General’s report on the adverse 
effects of tobacco use on health, Congress enacted the 
first legislation requiring compulsory explicit warning 
on cigarette packaging alerting users to the dangers 
inherent in smoking.42 
While tobacco users and pro-smoking groups may 
feel hemmed in by contemporary anti-tobacco use 
policy measures, the measures actually pale in com-
parison to the draconian and punitive penalties that 
used to be the norm, at a time when certain authori-
ties perceived tobacco use as a vice and corruptible 
influence that must be crushed.43 Examples range 
from the reputed execution of 18 tobacco smokers a 
day by Murald IV, the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, 
the slitting of smokers’ noses by the first Romanov 
Tsar of Russia, to the 4,000 percent tax hike slammed 
on tobacco products by King James I of England.44 
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However, contemporary anti-smoking policies do 
have a more rational basis: public health protection. 
In the following paragraphs, I will use ethical princi-
ples of paternalism, harm, and utilitarianism, as well 
as a rights-based legal argument, as the framework 
for evaluating public health protection rationalization 
of tobacco smoking proscription in enclosed public 
spaces. However, and significantly, the said ethical and 
legal principles are used not as an end in themselves, 
but as assessment tools for measuring the propriety of 
public health justifications for the liberty restraining 
laws on tobacco smoking in enclosed public spaces. 
Legal Paternalism, Nanny-statism, and 
the Defense of Public Health against 
Environmental Tobacco Smoke 
Legal paternalism has its roots in the Latin word 
pater, which means to act like a father or treat some-
one like a child.45 The term has been adapted by mod-
ern legal and political philosophers to describe situ-
ations where authority figures make decisions or act 
for another person or persons, ostensibly in their best 
interests or for their general good or welfare, and usu-
ally without their consent.46 According to Peter Suber, 
paternalism advances societal interests such as life, 
health, and safety, at the expense of their liberty, but 
it is controversial because it is necessarily coercive, 
albeit with benevolent objectives.47 Gerald Dworkin’s 
definition echoes similarly liberty-restraining feature 
of paternalism, while it purportedly serves societal 
general welfare and good: 
 [the] interference with a person’s liberty of action 
justified by reasons referring exclusively to the wel-
fare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or  values of 
the person being coerced.48 
Like Peter Suber, Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. 
Childress analogized paternalism with the father-fig-
ure who acts beneficently in what he conceives to be in 
the best interest of his children, and would prefer to 
make all or at least some of the decisions pertaining to 
their welfare.49 They then defined paternalism as:
 [t]he intentional overriding of one person’s known 
preferences or actions by another person, where 
the person who overrides justifies the action by the 
goal of benefiting or avoiding harm to the person 
whose preferences or actions are overridden.50 
Thus, legal paternalists would support laws prohib-
iting the use of narcotics or provision of compulsory 
social security, or health insurance for example.51 
While libertarians are generally opposed to legal 
paternalism, they do make an exception for paternal-
istic interventions on behalf of children and the vul-
nerable.52 Paternalism is often categorized into “soft” 
and “hard” paternalism.53 The principle of soft pater-
nalism justifies intervening in or overriding an indi-
vidual’s decision, where it is perceived that they lacked 
“the requisite decision-making capacity.”54 Generally, 
individuals could be deprived of requisite decision-
making capacity by a lack of adequate information or 
freedom, or due to immaturity or coercion.55 There-
fore, in the context of the general tobacco-smoking 
discouragement policy, given the addictive nature of 
tobacco, soft paternalism would justify any measure 
aimed at helping an individual who genuinely wanted 
to quit smoking, but who lacked the willpower, resolve, 
or capacity to do so.56 
However, it has been argued that soft paternalism 
is not really paternalistic at all since it does not really 
interfere with individual autonomy.57 This line of argu-
ment would appear to support the above-mentioned 
example of a cigarette smoker who genuinely would 
like to quit, but is addicted to nicotine. For him or 
her, the seemingly restrictive tobacco laws such as the 
ones promoting higher taxes and a ban on smoking in 
enclosed public spaces, could only strengthen his or 
her resolve to quit smoking rather than undermine or 
interfere with his or her autonomy to make a decision 
on the propriety of tobacco use. The flip side of soft 
paternalism is “hard” paternalism, and in the context 
of restrictive tobacco use policy, it would necessarily 
override or undermine the autonomy or privacy of 
tobacco users, who have no intention of quitting, but 
who are being frustrated by spiraling tobacco prices 
and the ever shrinking public space to smoke at will 
and in comfort. 
Therefore, in the context of public health policies 
such as tobacco smoking proscription in enclosed 
public places, “hard” paternalism,58 which has been 
described as the “real paternalism,”59 would still 
impinge on autonomy, liberty, or personal freedoms 
of smokers, even if the policy was designed to save 
them from harming themselves, as well as for the 
protection of the public from harmful environmental 
tobacco smoke.60 Significantly, not all paternalistic 
actions aimed at curbing tobacco use stem from politi-
cal authorities, and such curbs could be driven more 
by economics than by public health imperatives or the 
agenda to save the smoker from harming himself. This 
is exemplified by some U.S. employers who would pre-
fer to hire nonsmokers or tie job security to tobacco use 
cessation in order to cut the premium costs of employ-
ees’ health care insurance coverage.61 Such apparent 
discriminatory workplace practices would arguably be 
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paternalistic as they could pressure habitual smokers 
into sacrificing tobacco use for job security. 
More crucially, legal paternalistic strictures such as 
tobacco smoking proscription in enclosed public places 
do carry sanctions with punitive undertones. Accord-
ing to Peter Suber, the inherent punitive or criminal-
izing nature of paternalistic legislations make pater-
nalistic policies as instruments of behavioral change 
even more divisive.62 In the context of tobacco smok-
ing prohibition in enclosed public spaces for exam-
ple, smokers would not only suffer the concomitant 
inconvenience of not being able to smoke in enclosed 
public spaces, but could be fined or imprisoned if they 
flouted the law. However, it is arguable that since the 
prohibited act is not victimless or harmless as exem-
plified by the ills of environmental tobacco smoke 
catalogued above,63 any restrictions placed on the act 
would appear morally justifiable.
There is, however, a strong countervailing and liber-
tarian argument that smokers should only be scolded 
for “a private regarding indulgence” and not be sanc-
tioned, and that any legal prohibition is no more than 
extreme paternalism.64 This sentiment is aptly encap-
sulated in the following excerpt from Joel Feinberg’s 
work: 
 Many perfectly normal, rational persons volun-
tarily choose to run…a grave risk of lung cancer or 
heart disease… for whatever pleasures they find in 
smoking. The way the state can assure itself that 
such practices are truly voluntary is to confront 
smokers continually with the ugly medical facts so 
that there is no escaping the  knowledge of exactly 
what the medical risks to health are…. But to pro-
hibit [smoking] outright for everyone would be to 
tell voluntary risk-takers that even their informed 
judgments of what is worthwhile are less reason-
able than those of the state and that, therefore, 
they may not act on them. This is paternalism of 
the strong kind…. As a principle of public policy, it 
has an acrid moral flavor, and creates serious risks 
of governmental tyranny.65 
However, there are evident flaws in Feinberg’s argu-
ment. First, with the exception of the tiny Himalayan 
Kingdom of Bhutan, there is no country in the world 
where cigarette smoking is prohibited outright,66 
and due to economic, political, and social reasons, it 
is arguably a safe bet that Bhutan would remain an 
exception for the foreseeable future.67 Rather, there 
are a series of restrictive laws aimed at generally dis-
couraging tobacco use, and they range from a ban on 
tobacco smoking in enclosed public spaces to imposi-
tion of higher tariffs on tobacco products. 
Second, most countries now routinely advertise the 
dangers of tobacco use in the media, in conjunction 
with the legally required and often graphic health 
warnings on cigarette packaging. Therefore, and argu-
ably, smokers are already saturated with information 
on the inherent health risks of cigarette smoking, need-
less to mention cigarette-smoking medical personnel, 
who we must assume, know or should know everything 
there is to know about the dangers of smoking.68 Third, 
it would be disingenuous to characterize the current 
restrictive tobacco use laws as “government tyranny,” 
although there are truly circumstances whereby a law 
may be tyrannical, oppressive, immoral, or unjust,69 
but restrictive tobacco use regulation is arguably, most 
certainly not one of them. Besides, it is well within the 
constitutional remits of parliamentary democracies to 
pass laws that would protect the interests of the gen-
erality of the population from harm, even if such laws 
are strongly paternalistic, provided parliamentary or 
legislative due processes are duly followed.70 
Having discussed the essence of legal paternalism, 
the pertinent question is determining its ethical pro-
priety in the context of tobacco smoking proscription 
in enclosed public spaces. Since legal paternalism nec-
essarily curbs individual autonomy and freedoms, it is 
apt to ask whether or not the harms prevented from 
Since legal paternalism necessarily curbs individual autonomy and freedoms, 
it is apt to ask whether or not the harms prevented from befalling the public 
from environmental tobacco smoke outweigh the individual loss of freedom or 
autonomy to smoke cigarettes in enclosed public spaces. Without doubt, trading 
individual tobacco users’ autonomy or freedom to smoke in enclosed public 
spaces for the safety and well-being of the public would be morally justifiable. 
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befalling the public from environmental tobacco smoke 
outweigh the individual loss of freedom or autonomy 
to smoke cigarettes in enclosed public spaces. With-
out doubt, trading individual tobacco users’ autonomy 
or freedom to smoke in enclosed public spaces for the 
safety and well-being of the public would be morally 
justifiable.71 This is because the health of the public 
is paramount and its protection should trump indi-
vidual autonomy or freedom to smoke in enclosed 
public spaces, which is arguably a voluntary lifestyle, 
whose restriction is not life-threatening to smokers, 
and non-restriction could make victims of non-smok-
ers. Besides, it is clearly not the claim of opponents of 
the law that lawmakers lack the constitutional power 
or authority to pass anti-tobacco smoking laws per se; 
rather their central argument has almost always cen-
tered on their right to smoke cigarettes unrestrained 
and wherever they wished,72 an argument that will be 
separately dealt with later in this paper. 
In addition, and significantly, while paternalistic 
interventions in the context of tobacco smoking pro-
scription in enclosed public spaces are primarily aimed 
at safeguarding the public health, cigarette smokers 
could also benefit indirectly since the measure could 
over time, reduce their cravings for cigarettes and 
strengthen their will or encourage them to quit ciga-
rette smoking. This, in effect, would amount to saving 
cigarette smokers from themselves, since their will to 
quit could be impaired or compromised by the addic-
tive nature of nicotine. Therefore, paternalism pro-
vides a veritable and compelling moral basis for public 
health justificatory grounds for political constraints 
on individuals’ freedom to smoke in enclosed public 
spaces. 
However, if we agreed that public health was para-
mount, then viewed entirely from public health pro-
tection prisms, other than through paternalistic lens, 
there is a strong moral case for the expansion of the 
scope of the law prohibiting smoking in enclosed pub-
lic spaces, in order for it to accommodate a compre-
hensive and outright ban of tobacco smoking both in 
private and public spheres (whether enclosed or not) 
as in the Kingdom of Bhutan, for example.73 Without 
doubt, such a drastic measure would still fall under the 
remit of paternalism, or “strong” paternalism, accord-
ing to Joel Feinberg,74 and would be morally justifiable 
and defensible on grounds of public health protection, 
even if it “creates serious risks of governmental tyr-
anny.”75 Thus paternalism is no more than an ethical 
or philosophical framework or tool for assessing or 
rationalizing the morality or legitimacy of liberty-
restricting governmental legislations, and is arguably 
separable from the underlying policy objectives that 
underpin legislations, such as the imperatives of pub-
lic health protection. 
The Harm Principle Argument for 
Prohibiting Tobacco Smoking in  
Enclosed Public Spaces
In his seminal work, On Liberty, John Stuart Mills 
espoused the kernel of the “the harm principle” as 
follows:
 That principle is, that the sole end for which man-
kind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient war-
rant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or 
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, 
because it will make him happier, because in the 
opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even 
right. These good reasons for remonstrating with 
him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, 
or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or 
visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise….
The only part of the conduct of any one, for which 
he is answerable to society, is that which concerns 
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, 
his independence is, of right, absolute. Over him-
self, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign.76
Thus, the harm principle advocates absolute individ-
ual sovereignty over all matters concerning him, and 
that the only circumstance under which the state may 
coerce an individual is if such coercion will prevent 
harm from befalling persons other than the individ-
ual.77 According to Arthur Ripstein, the harm prin-
ciple has become the center piece of liberal perception 
of criminal law, as opposed to non-liberal constructs, 
which hold the view that criminal law could be used 
for broader moral agenda.78
Thus ex facie, the harm principle would appear 
narrower in scope than paternalism in the sense that 
while paternalistic legislations would readily brush 
aside individual autonomy or freedom both for their 
sake (with the aim of saving the individual from him-
self/herself ) and for the sake of the generality of the 
public, the harm principle could only undermine indi-
vidual autonomy or actions or omissions, if they would 
result in harm to other people other than the individu-
als. It is sacrosanct that environmental tobacco smoke 
causes harm to nonsmokers, and impairs public health, 
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so there is no doubting the aptness of using the harm 
principle argument in support of legislations prohibit-
ing tobacco smoking in enclosed public spaces. Theo-
retically, even the harm principle argument could be 
extrapolated to support argument for a comprehensive 
or complete ban on tobacco manufacturing, sales, and 
uses in public and private spheres, (including homes) 
as the said activities would cause harm to people other 
than those who are trading in and using tobacco.79 
Ironically, however, the harm principle would 
appear inherently limited as an argument to directly 
rein in cigarette smokers from harming themselves, as 
they do have absolute sovereignty over themselves, and 
could do whatever they liked provided that others are 
not endangered or harmed in the process. The indi-
vidual’s sovereignty over himself/herself is the kernel 
of the harm principle as noted above; therefore, the 
harm principle would allow individual cigarette users 
to smoke away provided their activities do not consti-
tute harm to others. Herein lays the inherent weak-
ness of the harm principle, since smokers crippled by 
ill health could indirectly impose social or economic 
losses on the society, such as losses induced by their 
regular absence from work, lost production, or dimin-
ished workplace efficiency for example.
However, Robert D. Tollison and Richard E. Wag-
ner, in their strongly pro-tobacco work sponsored by 
the Tobacco Institute, downplayed and rationalized 
any losses that could emanate from smokers’ regular 
absenteeism borne out of tobacco-related illnesses as 
follows:80 
 [a] day spent on sick leave is rarely wasted. Even 
such an activity as lying in bed and watching televi-
sion is valuable to the sick person, so in principle, 
the value of such activities should be subtracted 
from the lost earnings to arrive at a cost of the lost 
production due to illness. Furthermore, a consis-
tent application of the line of analysis that assigns 
a cost to lost work would have to conclude that 
weekends, holidays, and vacations also impose a 
cost of lost production upon society, for production 
is as much diminished by these days away from 
the workplace as it is by sick leave. Furthermore, 
sick leave may represent time spent fishing, and 
the value the worker places on a day of fishing may 
well exceed the lost output particularly in blue-
collar occupations. Such cases would actually rep-
resent a social benefit rather than a social cost.81 
However, while the time spent lying in bed and watch-
ing television may be valuable to the sick smoker, it 
is a time they would otherwise not have had or been 
entitled to if they had not been caught up in a tobacco-
related illness. Moreover, to equate the value of time 
spent by an employee smoker recuperating from a 
tobacco-induced illness with weekends, public holi-
days, and formal leave from work, which by the way, 
are standard features of most contract of employment, 
is at best ingenious. This is more so since an employee 
stricken with a tobacco-related illness and on sick 
leave would still stay away from work on weekends 
and public holidays. Therefore, it is little surprising 
that some U.S. employers would prefer non-smoking 
employees to employees who smoke.82
Crucially, another upshot of self-harm, which the 
harm principle endorses on the premise of individu-
als’ sovereignty over themselves, is the inevitable 
health burden that self-harm could place on the public 
health system through the escalation of public health 
care costs.83 Since smokers are susceptible to sundry 
tobacco-smoking related diseases such as lung cancer, 
there is no denying the fact that smokers could foist 
extra financial burden on the public health system 
especially in countries with compulsory health insur-
ance, or where national health care costs are subsidized 
by the government, or paid for by the taxpayers.84 
Therefore, to the extent that smokers’ self-destruc-
tive lifestyle could place an undue financial burden on 
the public health system, it is arguable that smokers 
are harming public interests, and by the very terms of 
the harm principle, they should be morally and legally 
banned from smoking. However, whether or not 
individuals whose chosen lifestyle causes self-harm 
should be refused medical treatment at the expense 
of the taxpayers raises ethical and legal issues that are 
beyond the scope of this paper.85 However, it is clear 
from the foregoing discourse that the harm principle 
could be used to rein in smokers not only because their 
habits directly cause harm to others via environmen-
tal tobacco smoke, but also on grounds that their cho-
sen lifestyle indirectly harms public interests through 
undue escalation of public health care costs. 
Significantly, the notion that tobacco smokers 
could drain public health care resources and thereby 
escalate public health care costs was queried by a 
1997 epidemiology and health economy paper.86 
According to Jan J. Barendregt et al., who authored 
the paper, while a major reduction in smoking could 
reduce health care expenditures in the short term, the 
costs would increase dramatically over the long term, 
as those who would have died of smoking-related 
diseases would live longer and might reach old age, 
where the costs of health care for old age-related dis-
eases are relatively higher.87 This view is better encap-
sulated by Robert D. Tollison and Richard E. Wag-
ner’s argument as follows: 
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 With shorter life spans, smokers make less use of 
extended stays in hospitals and convalescent homes 
where the expenses can become particularly heavy, 
in the later years of life, when many of the expenses 
are covered by Medicare and Medicaid. A smoker 
who dies seven years before his nonsmoking neigh-
bor will not be around to make those especially 
costly claims that occur later in life.88
However, the Barendregt study has been criticized for 
reducing everything to monetary costs and benefits, 
and that if it were to be followed, it would engender 
a favorable policy for cigarette smoking rather than 
a policy discouraging the habit.89 Arguably another 
major problem with the thesis of Jan J. Barendregt et 
al. and of Robert D. Tollison and Richard E. Wagner 
is that there is no way it could accurately monetize or 
account for the values represented by the contribu-
tions, which healthy individuals (who could have died 
earlier from tobacco-related diseases) would make to 
the society. Therefore, the thesis does not significantly 
derogate from the validity of the claim that smokers 
could indirectly harm public interests, through pos-
sible escalation of health care costs borne out of their 
chosen lifestyle. 
Viewed from the foregoing perspectives, the harm 
principle is a veritable tool for assessing the harm that 
tobacco smoking causes to non-smokers and smok-
ers, and could be used to justify laws prohibiting 
cigarette smoking in enclosed public spaces, in open 
and unenclosed public spaces, in homes and private 
premises, and even against the manufacture and sales 
of cigarettes. 
Utilitarian Moralism and the Proscription of 
Tobacco Smoking in Enclosed Public Places
Utilitarianism is an ethical and philosophical principle 
or political morality often used to promote and justify 
policies and acts, which produce the greatest happi-
ness for the members of the society.90 Utilitarianism 
demands that “…the production of happiness or the 
reduction of unhappiness should be the standard by 
which actions are judged right or wrong and by which 
rules of morality, laws, public policies, and social insti-
tutions are to be critically evaluated.”91 
Significantly, utilitarianism is anchored on “the 
principle of utility” which connotes the desirability of 
happiness as an end, and that all other things should 
serve as a means to that end.92 It is utilitarianism’s 
undue fixation on the consequences of what the end 
of an act or policy produces, rather than the means to 
that end, which evokes the concept of “utilitarianism’s 
consequentialism.”93 Thus by extrapolation, while 
some may perceive gambling as morally wrong, by the 
terms of utilitarianism’s consequentialism, gambling 
would not simply be prohibited unless it produces bad 
consequences for the people.94 However, it is not the 
intention of this paper to review the literature critiqu-
ing utilitarianism. Rather, the paper will take utilitari-
anism on the face value, and use it to assess the moral 
or ethical propriety of the policy prohibiting tobacco 
smoking in enclosed public spaces. 
Therefore, in the context of tobacco smoking pro-
scription in enclosed public spaces, the law would 
be morally justified not because smoking is morally 
wrong per se, but because its prohibition in enclosed 
public spaces would safeguard non-smokers from 
secondhand tobacco smoke, and protect them from 
secondhand tobacco smoke-related illnesses. Thus 
arguably, the consequences of prohibiting cigarette 
smoking in enclosed public places are in synch with 
public health protection policies, which in utilitarian 
context, could lead to the greatest happiness for the 
society as a whole. 
Significantly, it would appear that utilitarianism 
shares similar objectives of public health safeguard and 
promotion with paternalism and the harm principle 
as adumbrated above.95 Perhaps the crucial difference 
between the concepts is that utilitarianism and pater-
nalism, unlike the harm principle, implicitly discoun-
tenance individual preferences of tobacco smokers 
who would like to smoke wherever they wished. Thus 
while paternalism and utilitarianism could justify a 
comprehensive or absolute ban on tobacco smoking 
in enclosed and open public and private spheres, on 
grounds of public health protection, the harm prin-
ciple would only do so if tobacco smoking would cause 
harm to other persons other than the individual ciga-
rette smokers. However the three concepts do share a 
common feature in that they could be used to morally 
justify laws proscribing tobacco smoking in enclosed 
public spaces. 
A Rights-Based Perspective on Cigarette 
Smoking Proscription in Enclosed  
Public Spaces 
The argument has often been advanced that smok-
ers do have or should have the right to smoke at any-
time and wherever they choose to light up, and that 
laws such as the one prohibiting cigarette smoking 
in enclosed public spaces, are impinging on smok-
ers’ right to smoke.96 In this section, I will examine 
the validity of smokers’ claim to the rights to smoke 
vis-à-vis non-smokers’ rights to a tobacco smoke-free 
environment.
However, it is apt to discuss the general concept 
of rights before delving into whether or not smok-
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ers do have the rights to smoke. According to Mary 
Warnock:
 A right is an area of freedom for an individual that 
someone else has a duty to allow him to exercise, as 
a matter of justice. It is a freedom that one claims, 
for oneself or for another, and that one can prop-
erly prevent other people from inhibiting.97 
In modern democratic societies, rights do not exist in 
vacuum, but are usually conferred and guaranteed by 
national or international laws. For example, following 
the Second World War, the 1948 United Nations Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, established and 
guaranteed certain basic rights such as the right to 
life, freedom of speech, freedom of movement or lib-
erty, freedom of worship or religion, etc.,98 and mem-
ber states were enjoined to establish and guarantee 
similar rights in their domestic laws. 
It logically follows that in modern democratic soci-
eties, no one may claim to be entitled to a right that is 
unknown to law or not conferred by law. This propo-
sition would clearly exclude all natural, imaginary 
or hypothetical rights. Significantly, the proposition 
is a demonstration of legal positivist theory, a school 
of thought in jurisprudence and philosophy of law, 
championed by Jeremy Bentham, and rooted in the 
idea that the concept of natural rights is no more than 
a fallacy, and that without government, there could be 
no laws, and without laws, there could be no rights.99 
Thus, according to legal positivists, a right could 
only exist and be claimed if it was explicitly conferred 
by law,100 and that the very existence of a right in law 
in favor of one person, connotes the imposition of a 
duty on another not to obstruct the execution of the 
right, or stand in the way of implementing the right.101 
According to Jeremy Bentham, if someone thought 
that they were morally entitled to a right that was 
unknown to law, then they should argue for the law 
to be amended in order to accommodate their right.102 
Jeremy Bentham’s contempt for natural rights is 
encapsulated thus:
 Of natural right who has any idea? I, for my part, 
I have none: a natural right is a round square, – 
an incorporeal body. What a legal right is I know. 
I know how it was made. I know what it means 
when made. To me a right and a legal right are the 
same thing, for I know no other. Right and law are 
correlative terms: as much so as son and father. 
Right is with me the child of law: from different 
operations of the law result different sorts of rights. 
A natural right is a son that never had a father. By 
natural right is meant a sort of a thing which is 
to have the effect of law, which is to have an effect 
paramount to that of law, but which subsists not 
only without law, but against law: and its charac-
teristic property, as well as sole and constant use, is 
being the everlasting and irreconcilable enemy of 
law.103 
However, this line of reasoning has been criticized for 
giving undue authority or primacy to law, over pos-
sible fair, just, or moral causes, which the law might 
not protect, recognize or accommodate, or take cogni-
zance of,104 but which, arguably, are the sort of things 
that natural rights might accommodate. For according 
to Jeremy Waldron, “…natural right is an emancipa-
tory theory: it regards freedom, choice and self-deter-
mination as the natural condition of human beings 
and the customs and structures that hobble individual 
liberty as aberrations.”105 
Although legal positivists would dismiss any 
claimed right that is not expressly stated in the law or 
constitution, nevertheless, in practice, rights that are 
not explicitly stated in the law or the constitution, may 
be construed by the judiciary to be implied therein. 
For example, in the United States, the court has never 
recognized a constitutional right to any particular life-
style.106 However, in Jane Roe v. Henry Wade,107 the 
U.S Supreme Court held that “…only personal rights 
that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty’ are included in the guaran-
tee of personal liberty.”108 Thus, rights that are neither 
fundamental nor “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty” would comprise lower order rights, such as 
moral rights, and natural rights that Jeremy Bentham 
so much detested and railed against.109 This class of 
rights often exists by default and would ostensibly 
cover many activities that are not expressly prohibited 
or protected by the law or constitution. For example, in 
general, smokers do have an implicit right — natural 
or moral — to smoke at home or on private premises 
because this activity has not been expressly prohibited 
by any law. 
The pertinent question therefore is: How does legal 
positivism fare in the context of the claimed right by 
cigarette smokers to be able to smoke anywhere includ-
ing enclosed public spaces? Is there such a right in the 
first place, and if not, has it been unjustly excluded? 
To start with, despite the ready availability of tobacco 
products for sale across counters in supermarkets 
and shops around the world, there is no explicit fun-
damental right to smoke as such, because there is no 
known national law, constitutional or otherwise, that 
expressly confers such a right. Although a case could 
be made that the ready availability of tobacco prod-
ucts, as opposed to cocaine for example, provides a 
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tacit sanction by law that smokers could smoke ciga-
rettes freely wherever and whenever they wanted. If 
this were so (which is very doubtful, by the letters of 
legal positivism), then whatever tacit right that ciga-
rette smokers may have to smoke freely wherever they 
want has arguably been taken away by the explicit 
law prohibiting tobacco smoking in enclosed public 
places. 
This point is well exemplified by the United States 
District Court decision in NYC C.L.A.S.H., INC v. City 
of New York.110 CLASH challenged the constitutional-
ity of the smoking restrictions contained in the New 
York State Clean Indoor Air Act and the New York 
City Smoke Free Air Act, which prohibited smoking 
in most indoor places.111 It is instructive that while 
CLASH claimed the First Amendment protection 
for its members’ right to associate or gather together 
and smoke indoors at public places, it conceded in its 
claim that its members had no fundamental right to 
smoke per se, but “a right to smoke.”112 In dismissing 
their claims, the Federal District Court held inter alia 
as follows:
 A critical flaw inherent in CLASH’s First Amend-
ment arguments is the premise that association, 
speech, and general social interaction cannot occur 
or cannot be experienced to the fullest without 
smoking, or conversely, that unless smokers are 
allowed to light up on these occasions and at these 
places, their protected right is somehow funda-
mentally diminished. Implicit in this premise is 
that smoking enhances the quality of the social 
experience and elevates the enjoyment of smokers’ 
First Amendment rights; in other words, that only 
by being allowed to smoke can smokers contribute 
fully and enjoy to the maximum the experience of 
association, assembly, and speech in public spaces 
such as bars and restaurants. CLASH’s allegation 
that the Smoking Bans “curtail” certain activi-
ties for smokers, in essence suggests that smok-
ers cannot fully engage in conversation and other 
activities in bars and restaurants unless they are 
permitted to smoke, or that only by being permit-
ted to smoke in these places can they fully exer-
cise their constitutional rights of association and 
speech. Without summarily dismissing all pos-
sibility that smoking may contain some scintilla of 
associational value for some people, there is noth-
ing to say that smoking is a prerequisite to the full 
exercise of association and speech under the First 
Amendment.”113
The next logical question is whether the right to 
smoke freely has been wrongly or unjustly excluded or 
whether smokers have been discriminated against by 
the exclusion of their right to smoke from the law. This 
line of reasoning necessarily appeals to the concepts 
or theories of natural right, justice, or morality, which 
legal positivism clearly discountenances.114 Neverthe-
less, it could be argued that while tobacco smoking is 
not immoral per se, its ability to cause harm to non-
smokers is immoral and unjust, and consequently, cig-
arette smokers cannot appeal to morality or justice to 
have their rights recognized or accommodated by law. 
Alternatively, if smokers’ right to smoke freely were 
recognized and enshrined in law, the right would have 
to be exercised in such a way that it would not preju-
dice the right of non-smokers, since there is no abso-
lute right as such. For example an individual’s right to 
liberty or freedom of movement could be suspended 
by a lawful imprisonment imposed by a court of law 
for violations of the law of the land. In the same vein, 
a smoker’s right to smoke, if it existed, would have to 
be exercised in such a way so as not to impinge a non-
smokers’ right to a tobacco smoke-free environment. 
For example, the European Court of Human 
Rights has demonstrated its willingness to enforce a 
non-smoker’s right to a smoke-free environment, as 
exemplified by the case of Ostrovar v. Moldova.115 Mr. 
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Ostrovar was an asthmatic prisoner who was detained 
23 hours a day in a shared cell with up to 20 prison-
ers, some of whom were smokers. The prison was 
generally plagued with inadequate medical facility. 
The ECHR held that the Moldovan government had 
failed in their obligation to safeguard the prisoner’s 
health, in violation of Article 3 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, which prohibits inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.116 While the 
decision in Ostrovar cannot arguably be extrapolated 
to generally protect non-smokers from smokers in pri-
vate residences or spaces, it underscores the extent to 
which smoking right is defined and permitted by law. 
In other words, the right to smoke and where to smoke 
is at the whims of the law of the land. The question of 
whether or not smokers have a moral or natural right 
to smoke in enclosed public spaces is largely academic 
and could be discussed ad infinitum. However, such 
discourse won’t change or trump the law, which con-
tinually sets the boundary of smoking rights. 
Conclusions
In this paper, I explore the recent spate of tobacco 
laws prohibiting smoking in enclosed public spaces 
ostensibly on grounds of public health. Using ethical 
framework of paternalism, harm principle, and utili-
tarianism, and highlighting the unique characteristics 
of each ethical principle, I argue that the prohibition 
is ethically and morally justifiable in defense of pub-
lic health, which should of necessity, trump individual 
rights to smoke freely. Additionally, using legal posi-
tivist theory, I explore the argument on whether or 
not cigarette smokers have the right to smoke freely 
without constraints. Since legal rights are necessarily 
conferred and defined by law, I point out the fact that 
there is no such law that expressly vests the right to 
smoke freely in cigarette smokers. Rather, there are 
spates of restrictive laws that are designed to deliber-
ately discourage tobacco use. I also pursue the alterna-
tive argument that if there was a law that conferred 
smoking rights, then the rights would have to be exer-
cised without prejudice to the rights of non-smokers 
to a tobacco smoke-free environment. I conclude the 
paper by asserting that there is no right to smoke freely 
as such, and that to the extent that the laws prohibit-
ing tobacco smoking in enclosed public spaces do not 
impinge smokers’ rights, they are morally and legally 
justifiable. 
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